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A
mAbstract
Using a novel dataset from the 2006 Portuguese Labour Force Survey this paper
examines the impact of a voluntary reduction in hours of work, before retirement, on
the moment of exit from the labour force. If, as often suggested, flexibility in hours
of work is a useful measure to postpone retirement, then a reduction in working
hours should be associated with retirement at later ages. Results prove otherwise
suggesting that reducing hours of work before retirement is associated with early
exits from the labour force. A reduction in hours of work seems to signal the
worker’s wish to retire sooner rather than to announce the desire of remaining in
the labour market. This result may enclose the need for some alternative policy
strategies regarding working hours.
JEL codes: J14; J26; J22; J21
Keywords: Ageing; Retirement; Working hours; Older workers1 Introduction
Population ageing is increasing the ratio of retirees to workers rising sustainability is-
sues to Social Security systems. To ease financial pressures as well as to increase older
workers’ labour force participation policy makers have been promoting the expansion
of working lives finding measures that make postponed labour market exit attractive.
This has been enforced through the elimination of mandatory retirement, the adoption
of age discrimination legislation1 and/or increasing legal retirement age. Nonetheless, the
effect of these measures on older workers’ labour supply is not straightforward. For in-
stance, Shannon and Grierson (2004) show that making compulsory retirement illegal
would have a small impact on the size of the older workforce and, for that reason, such a
policy alone would not solve the problems associated with an ageing population and the
consequent reduction in the share of the population employed, while Ashenfelter and
Card (2002), studying the effect of the elimination of mandatory retirement at age 70 on
faculty retirement patterns, conclude that such elimination decreased by approximately
two thirds the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds.
On the other hand, Adams (2004) suggests that age discrimination legislation in-
creases employment among individuals that are in the legally protected age ranges and
that there is a decline in retirement among the protected workers. Also, Neumark and
Stock (1999) show that age discrimination laws lead to steeper age-earnings profiles in
the labour market and that they strengthen the relationship between workers and firms,
leading to the adoption of Lazear (1979) contracts. Furthermore, the authors find that
age discrimination legislation increases the relative employment of older workers.Machado and Portela; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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for women in Portugal, Martins et al. (2009) find that older women affected by the new
law faced virtually no change in wages and working hours.
There seems to be no unique and effective instrument to achieve a longer and higher
participation of older individuals in the labour force. Making use of survival analysis
techniques this paper brings another variable to the discussion on active ageing pol-
icies: it studies the impact of a reduction in hours of work before retirement on the age
of exit from the labour force. Indeed, combining a reduction in working hours with in-
creased leisure time at older ages may motivate individuals to work longer while grad-
ually withdrawing from the labour market. As individuals age, their preference for work
and leisure experience a change since older workers may get higher satisfaction from
additional hours of leisure and less hours of work than younger workers. Also, due to
health constraints or care obligations, as workers age they may want to reduce their
hours of work. This change in the valuation of time implies a change in reservation
wages over the life cycle, which influences the labour force participation decision.2
If workers could freely choose hours of work they would prefer to gradually reduce
their time at work as they age (Gustman and Steinmeier 2004). Since the decision does
not depend solely on the individual’s will, gradual retirement is not as common as
workers would like it to be (Hutchens and Grace-Martin 2006). Although there is evi-
dence for the United States that some workers engage in ‘part-time’ retirement by
working fewer hours in the years prior to complete withdrawal from the labour force
(Ruhm 1990; Burtless and Moffitt 1985; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984), most people
move directly from full-time work to full-time retirement (Hutchens and Grace-Martin
2006). As Gielen (2009) notes, a discrete drop in hours of work is only observed at the
time of retirement, not before.
Given that most often workers face the choice of working full-time or no time (retire-
ment), the constraint in hours of work may influence the labour force participation de-
cision. In fact, there are broad indications suggesting that reduced hours of work would
contribute to raise employment rates of older individuals. In the European Union, older
workers are already over-represented in part-time employment and Member States, like
Sweden, with higher shares of older workers in part-time employment tend to present
higher employment rates for the 55-64 age group. However, part-time employment is
not very common in the Portuguese labour market3 and, nevertheless, the economy
shows high employment rates for older individuals.
Despite the fact that flexibility in hours of work is perceived to be a relevant policy
mechanism to increase older individuals’ labour force participation, few studies focused
on its effect on labour supply. Among these, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) show that
working hours’ flexibility extends the working lives of older workers, but produces only
a small net increase in labour supply. Gielen (2009) finds that, especially for full-time
workers, over-employed older women (those reporting that they wish to work fewer
hours than the actual hours of work) leave the labour force prematurely due to the ab-
sence of gradual retirement opportunities. Nonetheless, a striking finding is that flexi-
bility in hours of work would result in a reduction of older workers’ labour supply
since the increase in labour participation of older workers due to the extension of their
working careers is cancelled out by a decline in working hours of over-employed older
individuals.
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(2006) studies how and why establishments differ in their willingness to permit an older
worker to take phased retirement. Phased retirement is perceived to be a way of
encouraging older workers to extend their working lives. In this sense, workers reduce
their working hours without changing employers (Hutchens and Papps 2005). The
former authors conclude that employers are willing to permit phased retirement but
primarily as an informal arrangement. Opportunities for phased retirement are greater
in establishments that employ part-time workers, allow job sharing and have flexible
starting times (this latter result is also obtained by Blau and Shvydko 2007).
If flexibility in hours of work, as a means of gradual retirement, can effectively delay
the exit from the labour force then workers who actually take advantage of such flexi-
bility are expected to leave the labour market later in their lives.
Overall, retirement decisions are influenced by individual characteristics, demo-
graphic factors, and financial incentives (Mitchell and Fields 1984; Dugan 1984; Belloni
and Rob 2008), health conditions (Burtless and Quinn 2000; Bartel and Sicherman 1993;
Hanoch and Honig 1983; Quinn 1977) and labour market constraints (Osberg 1993; Bartel
and Sicherman 1993; Friedberg 2003; Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2009). This paper examines
the influence of working hours’ reduction before retirement on the retirement decisions of
older individuals and intends to provide an answer to the following questions: is the reduc-
tion in hours of work associated with retirement at later ages? Can it be used to extend
older workers’ labour force participation and delay the complete withdraw from the labour
force? We find that a voluntarily reduction of working hours is associated with exit from
the labour market at earlier ages.
The main contribution of this research is to explore the relevance of working hours’
reduction on the retirement behaviour of older individuals. No such study exists for
Portugal and, hence, besides the novelty of this research for the Portuguese labour mar-
ket it is also a new contribution to the incipient literature on the subject. Additionally,
we take advantage of a recent and, to our knowledge, not yet used inquiry called “Tran-
sition to Retirement”, conducted simultaneously with the 2006 Portuguese Labour
Force Survey.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the major
legislation changes on retirement benefits eligibility in Portugal. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 presents the model and the empirical strategy. Results are shown in
Section 5. A summary and discussion conclude the paper.
2 Legal setting on retirement in Portugal
To accommodate demographic ageing and its impact on the Social Security system the
Portuguese government has approved several legislation changes concerning retirement
over the last fifteen years.
Since 1999, 65 years is the minimum legal age that grants access to full retirement
pension both for male and female workers in Portugal. By the end of 1993, the promul-
gation of a legal diploma set a gradual standardization of the legal retirement age
(LRA) for both men and women, with effectiveness from 1994 onward. Until then, the
LRA was 65 years for men and 62 years for women, and this law increased the LRA for
women by six months every year until reaching 65 years old (the LRA by 1999). Other
major changes introduced by the law were, on one hand, a raise from 10 to 15 in the
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gible for retirement benefits and, on the other hand, a change on the pensions’ method
of computation.
At the beginning of 1999, and in the course of macroeconomic growth, the age of ac-
cess to retirement was rendered more flexible, according to contributions’ profiles. In
this sense, a new law made it possible for workers at least 55 years old and a working
career of 30 complete calendar years to become eligible for pension benefits. Even
though there was a reduction factor linked to early retirement pensions, this flexibility
imposed significant financial pressure on the Social Security system. As a consequence,
the legal norms that allowed access to a pension before the worker reached the legal re-
tirement age were suspended in 2005. Early retirement schemes became once again
possible in 2007, over a new law that was published for discussion in November 2006,
but with severe penalties imposed to pensions. The 2007 law also prohibits the accu-
mulation of early retirement pension earnings with labour earnings if the worker re-
mains in the same firm or corporation.
Through legal changes, policy makers are trying to delay older workers’ exit from the
labour force.
An important feature of the Portuguese legislation on retirement is that there is no
possibility of partial retirement, that is, workers cannot continue in the labour market
through part-time employment while receiving partial retirement pension. Retirement
is a full-time job.
For a comprehensive synopsis on retirement legislation changes in Portugal see
Additional file 1: Appendix A in the web appendix to this paper.43 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a specific module of the Portuguese
Labour Force Survey (Inquérito ao Emprego) called “Transition to Retirement”. These
data were collected by the Portuguese Statistics Office (INE) and they refer to the sec-
ond quarter of 2006. The module was addressed to individuals aged 50 to 69, inclusive,
employed and non-employed. Non-employed individuals must have left the last job
with 50 or more years of age. The aim of the module is to obtain exhaustive and com-
parable information on the transition from active life into retirement, in order to keep
track of the progresses made in achieving the goals defined in the European Union to-
wards promoting active ageing and postponing labour force exit.
Table 1 shows the sample values for the Labour Force Survey (second quarter of
2006) and the “Transition to Retirement” module.Table 1 Sample values, Labour Force Survey (LFS) (second quarter 2006)
Total Men Women
Total % Total %
Individuals surveyed in the LFS 45,166 21,584 47.79 23,582 52.21
Individuals aged 50 to 69 in the LFS 11,685 5,439 46.55 6,246 53.45
Individuals surveyed in the module 9,485 5,044 53.18 4,441 46.82
Source: Explanation document from the Labour Force Survey’s 2006 module “Transition to Retirement”, INE.
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the case for the subsample of individuals aged 50 to 69. However, gender representation
is reversed in the “Transition to Retirement” module, with men accounting for 53% of
the responses. Therefore, the module sample does not reproduce accurately the Labour
Force Survey’s gender composition.
From the initial sample we have excluded the military for they face a specific
labour market (22 individuals), students (26 observations), and also unpaid house-
hold workers (371 observations - 99% of which are women) or other inactive older
individuals (507 observations) due to a fragile involvement in the labour market.
Also, we left out the unemployed (236 observations) because their motivation
towards the reduction in hours of work is naturally biased, since they want to
increase their actual number of hours of work (and, therefore, may report the
intention of no reduction in hours of work just because they are currently out of
employment), and the self-employed (2871 observations) since they can more freely
alter hours of work than employees.
The sample includes individuals with 15 or more years of work (80 observations de-
leted) because this is the minimum required number of years with payments to Social
Security for a worker to become eligible for retirement benefits. Finally, miners and
fishermen were also excluded (73 observations) since, due to the legally recognized
weary nature of these occupations, they are subject to specific retirement legislation
and may withdraw from the labour force before age 65.5 These exclusions led to the
sample size depicted in Table 2.
The questionnaire of the “Transition to Retirement” module is presented in Additional
file 1: Appendix B of the web appendix. Besides the variables collected through the
questionnaire, the database includes additional information taken from the Labour Force
Survey like gender, age, marital status, education, labour market situation (employed,
unemployed, retired, home worker, student, other inactive) and nationality. For
employed individuals it also presents information on the location, industry and size of
the firm where they work and on the occupation, type of contract, date of admission into
the firm, regime of work (part-time or full-time), hours of work and earnings. For those
non-employed it shows the reason for leaving the last job, occupation held and the
industry where he/she worked. Information on labour earnings before retirement is
inexistent. Unfortunately, non-employed respondents were not asked about their labour
income prior to retirement or unemployment. Also, the survey does not include any
measure of the individual’s wealth. This is regrettable since income and wealth are
important determinants of the retirement decision (Hanoch and Honig 1983; Mitchell
and Fields 1984; Dugan 1984; Ruhm 1990).Table 2 Study sample
Sample




Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Note: (1)These have completely withdrawn from the labour force.
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research: “Did you reduce or do you intend to reduce your working schedule before exiting
the labour force?” The inquiry’s instructions state that “exiting the labour force” means hav-
ing no professional occupation with earnings as motivation, regardless of the legal retirement
age. A summary of the possible answers is illustrated in Table 3 according to the individuals’
labour market status. Answering “Yes, I have reduced it” means that the individual has
intentionally reduced his/her working hours to prepare the exit from the labour force.
As Table 3 shows, one in five retirees has reduced hours of work before retirement. These
individuals averaged 64 years of age in 2006 and 59 years old when they started collecting a
retirement pension, which is clearly below the legal retirement age. Data additionally show
that those who did and those who did not reduce hours of work present the same age
averages; thus, one may start wondering about the efficacy of hours’ reduction on postponing
the exit from the labour force. Nevertheless, early retirement was very attractive in Portugal
until 2005. Negligible penalties on pension benefits for those exiting the labour market before
age 65 made early retirement very appealing. Hence, this sample feature of labour force
withdrawal before reaching the legal retirement age may be explained by Social Security
incentives.
As for employed older individuals, only a little more than 3% report a reduction in hours
of work to prepare their exit from the labour force and their mean age is 59 years old. On
average, these individuals are older than the ones who have not reduced their working hours.
Other two questions of relevance are: Question 3b “At what age do you intend to leave the
labour force?” and Question 7b “At what age did you start collecting a retirement pension?”
Question 3b is addressed to individuals who are still in the labour force, in this case
employed older individuals, while Question 7b is directed both at people who might already
be retired and at employed individuals. The mean intended age of retirement is 64 years old
and 59 is the mean and median age of start of pension collection. Conditional on being in
the labour force, employed individuals report a higher “expected” age of retirement when
compared to the average age of retirement of retirees (64 versus 59 years old, respectively).
Considering that in 2005 (see Additional file 1: Appendix A in the web appendix) a legal dip-
loma suspended all early retirement schemes, making the collection of pension benefits only
possible at age 65 or over, retirement expectations of active individuals are surely influenced.
Table 4 provides detailed descriptive statistics of the sample used in the empirical analysis
by gender and labour force status. The average working career of Portuguese workers is con-
siderably long. Retired individuals have worked for almost 40 years and they started collecting
retirement pension benefits before age 60, on average. Women have shorter careers in theTable 3 Working hours’ reduction before retirement, by labour market status
Hours’ reduction (before retirement) Employed Retired(1)
(a) Yes, I have reduced it 3.25% 20.98%
(b) No, but I intend to reduce it in the next 5 years 11.96% –
(c) No, and I have no intention to do so in the next 5 years/Did not reduce 30.37% 79.02%
(d) Will not reduce 54.41% –
Observations 3,319 1,954
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Note: (1)Retired individuals that have answered “No, but intends to reduce it in the next 5 years” or “Won’t reduce” were
reclassified into the category “Did not reduce” for they are already out of the labour force.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics, by gender and labour force status
Variable All Men Women
Labour force status All Retired Employed All Retired Employed All Retired Employed
Age(1) 56.84 58.82 55.68 56.85 58.67 55.75 56.84 59.02 55.59
(4.86) (4.72) (4.56) (4.82) (4.69) (4.56) (4.91) (4.74) (4.57)
Years of work(1) 37.95 39.60 36.98 39.30 40.81 38.39 36.35 38.11 35.33
(7.93) (7.95) (7.76) (7.20) (7.22) (7.04) (8.45) (8.53) (8.23)
Reduction(2) (Yes) 9.82 20.98 3.25 8.45 19.96 1.51 11.46 22.23 5.29
Activity sector
Agriculture 5.59 7.37 4.55 5.17 4.92 5.31 6.10 10.38 3.66
Industrial 28.43 31.83 26.42 37.52 39.00 36.63 17.61 23.03 14.50
Services 65.98 60.80 69.03 57.31 56.08 58.05 76.29 66.59 81.84
Blue-collar 54.45 53.89 54.78 59.23 55.15 61.69 48.75 52.34 46.70
Education
0 years 11.87 19.75 7.23 8.62 12.91 6.04 15.74 28.16 8.62
4 years 51.55 46.88 54.29 56.37 55.25 57.05 45.81 36.60 51.08
6 years 6.77 5.73 7.38 7.19 6.59 7.55 6.27 4.68 7.18
9 years 11.06 11.21 10.97 11.55 12.53 10.96 10.47 9.58 10.97
High school 6.92 6.45 7.20 6.70 6.87 6.60 7.18 5.93 7.90
University 11.83 9.98 12.93 9.56 5.85 11.80 14.53 15.05 14.24
Region
North 24.50 22.72 24.83 25.55 24.88 25.95 22.26 20.07 23.51
Centre 12.90 10.39 14.37 13.16 10.21 14.93 12.58 10.60 13.72
Lisbon 22.57 25.74 20.70 21.40 26.18 18.51 23.96 25.20 23.25
Alentejo 15.91 17.86 14.76 14.21 15.04 13.70 17.94 21.32 16.00
Algarve 9.84 9.77 9.88 9.56 10.03 9.28 10.17 9.46 10.58
Azores 6.96 7.47 6.66 8.48 8.82 8.28 5.15 5.82 4.77
Madeira 7.78 6.04 8.80 7.64 4.83 9.34 7.93 7.53 8.16
Active spouse(3) 62.58 23.45 85.94 67.73 39.62 87.86 59.48 11.74 84.91
Observations 5,273 1,954 3,319 2,865 1,077 1,788 2,408 877 1,531
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Notes: For retired individuals, the variable Age refers to the age of start of pension benefits’ receipt. (1)Continuous
variables: standard deviations are presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies and values reported are
percentages. (2)Answers (b), (c) and (d) of Question 2 were gathered into a single category “Did not reduce”. (3)There are
2,670 observations for the variable Active spouse.
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reduction of hours of work is not very common in the Portuguese labour market: less than
10%6 of the individuals report a reduction in hours of work as a way of gradual retirement.
Women reduce hours of work to a greater extent than men, and this difference is more
pronounced for those still in the labour force (i.e., employed).
Almost two thirds of the individuals in the sample work in Services, which is also the
activity sector where a reduction in hours of work before retirement is more prevalent, both
for men and women. For 54% of the individuals the occupation held was classified as blue-
collar. The definitions of blue/white collar and the industries included in each of the
activity sectors are presented in Additional file 1: Appendix C in the web appendix (Tables
C1 and C2).
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have 4 or less years of school attainment. This feature of the sample is not surprising given
the age range of the individuals, 50 to 69 years old (which means that they were born
between 1937 and 1964) and the fact that until 1986 mandatory schooling in Portugal
comprised just 6 years.7 However, almost 12% of the individuals show higher education
attainment, with women reporting a higher incidence of this higher educational level.
A worker’s participation in the labour force may be modelled using survival analysis where
survival is interpreted as the presence in the labour market. The use of survival analysis
techniques to describe the data, which is done in Figure 1, shows that, as expected, the
cumulative hazard8 in Figure 1 is rising with age at an increasing rate and it faces a
considerable increase at age 65.9
Relating the Age of exit from the labour force with the Reduction variable, Figure 2 plots
the survival function by reduction status (that is, if the individual reduced or not his/her
hours of work) and gender. It shows that those with a reduction in hours are more likely to
exit the labour market at earlier ages.10 This is true for both men and women, but the
difference in survival times by reduction status is higher for men than for women.
4 Econometric setup
4.1 Transition data models: a parametric approach
Transition or duration analysis models the length of time spent in a given state (for instance,
in the labour force) before transition to another state (e.g. retired). The time of transition to
retirement is called “failure time”. A “state” is a qualitative characteristic of an individual at a
specific point in time, “transition” is the change from one state to another, and a “spell”
length or duration is the time spent in a given state.
In the empirical analysis there are two possible states a person can be in: active (in the
labour force) or retired (out of the labour force). By failure time we mean the age of retire-
ment (the age of exit from the labour force). The hazard rate is defined as the probability that
retirement will occur at a particular age to an individual, given that the individual is at risk
(i.e. in the labour force) at that age. The hazard is an unobserved variable, but it controls both
the occurrence and the timing of events (or state transitions). Therefore, it is the fundamental
dependent variable in transition data models. If the hazard is known to depend strongly onFigure 1 Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates. Source: Computations from the authors based on
the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates, by reduction status and gender. Source: Computations
from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
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then age is the most appropriate way to define the time scale (Allison 1984).
Due to the nature of the data used, some individuals are already in the initial state (thus we
do not observe the date of entry into the labour market). This is relevant for the definition of
the “spell”. With age as the time scale and because the starting times are not observed, the
spell is the duration of an individual’s life until retirement. From now on we will call this
duration a “spell of activity” (although it does not measure the number of working years).
We assume that, once an individual leaves the initial state (becomes retired), he/she
remains in inactivity (that is, there is no reversed retirement; individuals do not come back to
the labour force after retirement) which is not a very strong assumption considering that,
according to the European Commission (2007), more than 99% of the people that were
inactive in a given year remain inactive in the following year.
Transition or survival data are usually censored since some spells are incompletely
observed. A complete spell of activity can be seen for retirees but for subjects that are still in
the labour force we do not observe the complete spell of activity. That means that data are
right-censored or censored from above. Censoring is the main reason for modelling
transitions instead of the mean duration as weaker distributional assumptions are needed to
obtain consistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
A Weibull parametric regression model is used to study the effect of a reduction in hours
of work on the age until which a person remains in the labour force. The Weibull has a
hazard function given by λ(t) = γαtα-1,11 where γ is the hazard rate, α is a shape parameter
indicating the monotonicity of the function and t is a time variable. The hazard function will
be monotonically increasing if α > 1 and monotonically decreasing if α < 1. The Weibull
distribution assumes that γ > 0 and α > 0. In other words, it considers a hazard that it is not
constant over time.
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Trivedi (2005), with censored data the observed survival time t is the age at an incomplete
spell, and the data are augmented by a censoring indicator variable. For right-censored
observations it is known that the age of retirement exceeded t so the contribution to the
likelihood is
Pr T > t½  ¼
Z∞
t
f u x; θÞdu ¼ 1−F t x; θÞ ¼ S t x; θÞjðjðjð ð1Þ
where T denotes the age of retirement without censoring, x are regressors that can vary
across individuals but do not vary over a spell for a given individual and θ is a q × 1
parameter vector. S(.) represents the survivor function.
The conditional density for the i th observation is f (ti | xi, θ)
δi S(ti | xi, θ)
1-δi, where δi is a
right-censoring indicator with
δi ¼ 1; if complete spell nocensoringð Þ0; if incomplete spell right censoringð Þ

Taking logs and summing, assuming independence over i, the maximum likelihoodestimator θ^ maximizes the likelihood function
ln L θð Þ ¼
XN
i¼1
δi ln f ti xi; θÞ þ 1−δið Þ ln S ti xi; θÞjðjð½ ð2Þ
In the Weibull model, regressors are usually introduced by letting γ= exp(x’β), ensuring
that γ > 0 while α, the shape parameter, does not vary with regressors. Then,
ln f t x;β; αÞ ¼ ln exp x 0 βð Þα tα−1 exp − exp x 0 βð Þtαð Þ  ¼ x 0 βþ ln αþ α−1ð Þ ln t− exp x 0 βð Þtα
and
ln S t x; β; αÞ ¼ ln exp − exp x 0 βð Þtαð Þ½  ¼ − exp x 0 βð Þtαjð
Then, the likelihood function in (2) becomesln L ¼
X
i
δi x 0 iβþ ln αþ α−1ð Þ ln ti− exp x 0 iβð Þtαi
 
− 1−δið Þ exp x 0 iβð Þtαi
 
: ð3Þ
The key policy variable in the model is the reduction of hours on work before retirementand its impact on the retirement hazard is of relevance for this analysis.
4.2 Variables used in the estimation
Working hours’ reduction is the explanatory variable of interest in the model. Question 2 of
the survey allows four possible answers (see Table 3). We consider answers (c) and (d) as
being the same for those employed, meaning that they will not reduce hours of work before
exiting the labour force. The main issue is how to treat the workers’ ‘intentions of reduction’
(answer (b)). For retirees this problem does not arise since they either reduced or did not
reduce their hours of work before leaving the labour market. As for employed individuals the
treatment is not as straightforward.
Nevertheless, in order to explore this variable we use two different classifications for it.
First, we consider just the actions that have occurred so far, that is, treat the intentions as
non-actions. We therefore construct a variable called Reduction A which equals 0 if the
Machado and Portela IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 11 of 222014, 3:16
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/16person did not/will not reduce hours of work or if he/she intends to do so, and 1 if the
individual has already reduced. If, however, intentions can predict future actions, treating
intentions as actions might be useful to study the influence of an action (reduction in hours
of work) on an outcome (labour force participation) when the specific action has not yet
occurred. The study of intentions and subsequent behaviour is a subject of relevance in
Psychology. The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980;12 Fishbein and Ajzen
1975) postulates that a person’s intention to engage in behaviour is the immediate determin-
ant of that behaviour. In other words, people are expected to behave in accordance with their
intentions. Evidence also provides support to the theory by showing high correlations
between intentions and actual behaviour that range from 0.72 to 0.90 (Ajzen 2005). In the
light of this theory, and as a second alternative, we treat reported intention of reducing hours
of work as an action in order to study its effect on the elderly ‘survival’ in the labour force.
The resulting variable is Reduction B which is equal to 0 if the person will not reduce hours
of work and 1 if the individual did reduce or intends to do so. We expect that using these
alternative Reduction variables will enable us to see how sensitive the age of exit from the
labour force is to the assumptions made for the variable of interest.
Age is the analysis time variable and it refers to the actual age for the people that are still
active (incomplete spells) but, for retired individuals (complete spells), it is the age of
retirement. We use the age at which the individual started receiving a retirement pension as
a proxy for the age of retirement, since the survey does not ask when he/she actually
withdrew from the labour force (the retirement age) but it asks the age he/she started collect-
ing a pension.13 This is done in order to capture the approximate moment of failure (exit)
for retirees. Also, in Question 3b14 of the survey people report the age at which they intend
to retire and this age intention is used as the analysis time variable for employed subjects
when using the Reduction B as the covariate of interest.
Another limitation as a consequence of the questionnaire’s design is that it is not possible
to know when the reduction started (close or far from the effective age of exit) or the amount
of hours reduced (for example, if the worker made a transition from full-time to part-time
employment, or if it was just a 1 hour reduction). Such information would contribute to the
enrichment of the analysis.
Besides the Reduction variable we also include in the model regressors like gender, activity
sector, type of occupation, education and region of residence. Additionally, for married (or
living with a partner) people we include the spouse/partner labour force status (active or
retired). Table 5 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used.
There are 37% of failures (retirees) in the sample which means that the rest of the
observations in the sample are censored.
The overall sample is also characterized by low educational levels. Younger individuals are
more educated than older ones. Indeed, only 5% of the individuals aged 65 to 69 have a
university degree, against 8%, 13% and 15% for those in the age groups 60-64, 55-59
and 50-54, respectively. Women are overrepresented both at the bottom (0 years) and
at the top (university) of the education ladder, and more than ¾ work in the Services.
Also, women reduce hours of work more often than men. Table 6 provides additional
labour market statistics concerning hours of work, activity sector and gender. It shows
that women work fewer hours than men regardless of the activity sector.
Finally, from Table 5, both the likelihood of retirement and the probability of reducing
hours of work rise with age.
Table 5 Definition of the variables and mean characteristics
Variable Definition Mean or percentage
All Men Women




Retired (failure) =1 if the person already exit the labour force 37.06 37.59 36.42
Reduction A =1 if the individual has effectively reduced his/her hours of work 9.82 8.45 11.46
Reduction B(2) =1 if the individual did reduce or intends to reduce hours of work 20.12 19.20 21.21
Male =1 if the person is of male gender 54.33 – –
Activity sector
Agriculture =1 if the person works or worked in the agriculture sector 5.59 5.17 6.10
Industrial =2 if the person works or worked in the industrial sector 28.43 37.52 17.61
Services =3 if the person works or worked in the services sector
(omitted category)
65.98 57.31 76.29




0 years =1 if the person has no complete degree of education 11.87 8.62 15.74
4 years =2 if the person completed 4 years of education 51.55 56.37 45.81
6 years =3 if the person completed 6 years of education 6.77 7.19 6.27
9 years =4 if the person completed 9 years of education 11.06 11.55 10.47
High school =5 if the person has a high-school diploma 6.92 6.70 7.18
University =6 if college degree 11.83 9.52 14.53
Region
North =1 if the person resides in the North of Portugal
(omitted category)
24.05 25.55 22.26
Centre =2 if the person resides in the Centre 12.90 13.16 12.58
Lisbon =3 if resides in Lisbon 22.57 21.40 23.96
Alentejo =4 if he/she resides in Alentejo 15.91 14.21 17.94
Algarve =5 if he/she resides in Algarve 9.84 9.56 10.17
Azores =6 if he/she resides in Azores 6.96 8.48 5.15
Madeira =7 if he/she resides in Madeira 7.78 7.64 7.93
Active spouse(3) =1 if the spouse is still in activity 62.58 67.73 59.48
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Note: (1)Standard deviation of the variable Age; (2)There are 2,738 observations for this variable; (3)There are 2,670
observations for the variable Active spouse. Number of observations: 5,273.
Machado and Portela IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 12 of 222014, 3:16
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/165 Results
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the Weibull model in the presence of censoring.
Estimates on the Weibull parameter α suggest that the hazard is increasing over time α> 1,
at an increasing rate (α> 2).15
Moreover, despite the assumptions made for the Reduction variable, results remain
unchanged: the reduction of hours of work before leaving the labour market shortens an
individual’s presence in the labour force. In fact, in Table 7 the coefficient on Reduction A at
column (1) suggests that reducing hours of work increases the hazard rate by 61% compared
to the subjects that did not reduce hours of work. Gielen (2009) finds that working hours
flexibility have a positive effect on labour force participation of older women, but increasing
working hours flexibility has little effect on raising older workers’ total labour supply.
Table 6 Distribution of employed population by regular hours of work, activity sector





Agriculture Industrial Services Total
All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
1-10 10.39 6.85 14.10 0.43 0.36 0.62 1.31 0.49 1.99 2.12 1.16 3.26
11-30 39.12 35.58 42.85 2.56 1.75 4.57 8.38 4.59 11.52 10.26 6.94 14.15
31-35 1.90 2.06 1.73 1.40 1.11 2.12 22.02 17.43 25.82 13.37 9.13 18.34
36-40 20.39 23.52 17.11 79.18 77.12 84.34 48.67 52.10 45.82 54.58 58.95 49.82
41 or more 25.20 29.10 21.11 15.54 18.60 7.83 18.83 24.20 14.37 18.58 22.51 14.37
Source: INE. Labour Force Survey, 2nd quarter 2006. Portugal, National Statistics Office (INE) (2009), Statistics obtained on
November 2009 from www.ine.pt.
Note: Values reported are percentages. Some columns do not sum 100%, due to missing values.
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effective in raising older workers’ labour force participation and concludes that working
hours’ flexibility may not be a suitable instrument to improve older workers’ labour supply.
Using simulations, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) suggest that if firms allowed partial re-
tirement at the same hourly wage, this would impact retirement outcomes: partial retirement
would increase from 30% to 67%. When there is no restriction in partial retirement, the
percentage completely retired declines by 4.7 to 14.1 percentage points at each year of age
between 58 and 65. Additionally, the number fully retired falls by 15.3 and 13.8 percentage
points, respectively, for ages 67 and 69. Nevertheless, half the increase in partial retirementTable 7 Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction A
Variable All All All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reduction A 0.477*** 0.330*** 0.343*** 0.637*** 0.330***
(0.057) (0.079) (0.082) (0.080) (0.083)
Male 0.018 0.068 -0.036 – –
(0.049) (0.069) (0.054)
Reduction A × Male – – 0.265** – –
(0.112)
Activity sector
Agriculture 0.018 0.020 0.012 -0.397*** 0.359***
(0.098) (0.133) (0.098) (0.153) (0.133)
Industrial 0.255*** 0.291*** 0.248*** 0.026 0.620***
(0.056) (0.082) (0.056) (0.072) (0.088)
Blue-collar -0.330*** -0.331*** -0.324*** -0.437*** -0.154
(0.062) (0.094) (0.062) (0.079) (0.102)
Active spouse – -0.886*** – – –
(0.077)
α 15.749 15.615 15.760 15.475 16.275
(0.251) (0.365) (0.251) (0.334) (0.383)
Observations 5,273 2,670 5,273 2,865 2,408
Log likelihood 1,000.678 629.093 1,003.460 556.010 494.336
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. All
models have Education and Region dummies.
Table 8 Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction B
Variable All All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduction B 0.124*** 0.145** 0.133** 0.162**
(0.048) (0.070) (0.067) (0.070)
Male 0.033 0.041 – –
(0.041) (0.045)
Reduction B × Male – -0.041 – –
(0.096)
Activity sector
Agriculture -0.026 -0.026 -0.224* 0.101
(0.084) (0.084) (0.126) (0.117)
Industrial 0.098** 0.099** -0.012 0.316***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.061) (0.078)
Blue-collar -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.402*** -0.099
(0.053) (0.053) (0.069) (0.083)
α 15.290 15.290 15.170 15.686
(0.203) (0.234) (0.315) (0.355)
Observations 2,738 2,738 1,484 1,254
Log likelihood 3,128.664 3,128.754 1,690.526 1,462.922
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. Portugal, National
Statistics Office (INE) (2009), data from the Labour Force Survey in magnetic medium.
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. All
models have Education and Region dummies.
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those aged 62 to 69 who have a long term commitment to the labour market, the flexibility
in hours of work would contribute to reduce by 10 to 15 percentage points the fraction
completely retired. Partial retirement in that age group would increase by 20 percentage
points. If hours’ constraints were abolished, partial retirement would increase significantly
but full-time employment and full-time retirement would reduce, resulting in a small net
increase in full-time equivalent employment. This suggests that working hours’ flexibility
plays a marginal role in the expansion of overall older workers’ labour force participation.16
The variable Reduction that we use is more limited and less informative than the
approaches used in the literature. We use only an indicator variable and other studies use
hours of work to assess the reduction. Additionally, these studies take advantage of longitu-
dinal data while we use cross-sectional data. Also, previous literature focuses on the labour
force participation and not on the age of retirement.
One may wonder if the reduction of hours of work was the result of the will of the worker
or if it was initiated by the employer. In the eminence of a layoff firms often reduce hours
of work before permanent shutdown and the reduction of working time could be capturing
this effect. Nevertheless, considering just the subsample of retirees, looking at the reason for
retirement (Question T10 of the survey) it is possible to see that only 1.5% of the retirees
reporting a reduction in hours of work before retirement answer “job loss” as the reason for
retirement. Therefore, the fear of a potential endogeneity problem can be mitigated.
Figure 3 clearly shows that the hazard of retirement increases with age at an increasing
rate and that it is higher for individuals that reduced hours of work. The same pattern is
Figure 3 Retirement hazard, by reduction status (Reduction A). Source: Computations from the authors
based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
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on average stay longer in the labour market.
The coefficients for the Blue-collar variable are negative and quite similar through
columns (1) to (3), Table 7. The coefficient in column (1) shows that blue-collar workers
experience a hazard rate that is only 72% of the hazard for white-collar workers. This result
is consistent with the findings of Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005). However, this result may be
capturing an income effect. In the absence of income and wealth variables, since blue-collar
occupations are associated with lower earnings, that result may hint on the fact that individ-
uals with lower wages retire at later ages.
Looking at column (2) in Table 7, for those who are married or live with a partner, having
a wife/husband that is still in the labour force reduces the retirement hazard. Effectively, the
hazard of retirement for those who have an active spouse is just 41% of the hazard for those
who have a spouse who is already out of the labour force. Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005) and
Johnson et al. (2000) present similar findings. The former authors conclude that the odds of
retiring early are 44% higher for those with a non-active partner. While the latter find that
individuals were less likely to retire if their spouses were still working than if their spouses
were already retired.Figure 4 Survival curve, by reduction status (Reduction A). Source: Computations from the authors
based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
Machado and Portela IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 16 of 222014, 3:16
http://www.izajoels.com/content/3/1/16The variable Male shows no statistical significance, which means that there is no
difference in the retirement hazard between men and women. Also, those working in the
industrial sector face a 34% higher hazard than those working in services.
Column (3) introduces an interaction term between the Reduction variable and gender.
Results show that those who reduce hours of work face a hazard 41% higher than those
who do not reduce hours. Additionally, men who reduce hours of work increase the hazard
of retirement by 30%.
Dividing the sample by gender, separate estimates for men and women are presented
in columns (4) and (5) of Table 7. Both for men and women, a reduction in hours of
work before retirement is associated with a higher retirement hazard. A Chow test17
performed on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients
between men and women. Also, for a 95% confidence level, the difference between the
gender coefficients on the Reduction A variable is statistically significant. For the Swiss
case, Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005) find that men are more likely to retire earlier than
women. There are statistical differences in the explanatory power of the covariates for
men and women. For men, the retirement hazard of those who reduced hours of work
compared to those who did not (1.89) is 60 percentage points higher than the hazard
obtained for women (1.39). The interaction term estimate in column (3), Table 7, high-
lights the above reported difference in the hazard for men and women, between those
who reduced hours of work and those who did not.
Comparing columns (4) and (5) in Table 7 we find relevant gender differences
concerning the impact of the variable Activity sector on the hazard. Effectively, men
employed in agriculture experience a retirement hazard that is only 67% of the hazard
for men that work in services. There are no differences in the hazard between men
employed in services and those in the industrial sector. However, for women, the effect
is quite the opposite: women in agriculture and in the industrial sectors face, respect-
ively, a 43% and 85% higher hazard than women employed in services. It seems that
being employed in services is associated with retirement at earlier ages for men while,
for women, working in services delays retirement. Because work in agriculture and
in the industrial sectors is more physically demanding, women may want to exit
the labour force earlier. The impact of the variable Blue-collar is also different
between genders. Men in blue-collar occupations have a smaller retirement hazard
compared to men in white-collar occupations (the hazard for blue-collars is only 65%
of the retirement hazard for white-collar men). Since wages are particularly low in
blue-collar occupations, these workers probably do not have the financial support
needed to exit the labour force at early ages. As for women, there are no statistical
differences between the hazards experienced by female employees in white or blue-
collar occupations.
Treating intentions as the best predictor of future actions, Table 8 reports the same
effect of the Reduction variable on the retirement hazard as in the previous analysis.
From Table 8, column (1), those who have reduced hours of work before leaving the
labour market face a 13% higher hazard of retirement than those who did not. Again, it
indicates that the reduction in working hours is associated with retirement at earlier ages.
When intentions are treated as effective actions (Reduction B, Table 8) the retirement
hazard declines by 48 percentage points compared to the hazard in column (1) of
Table 7 (Reduction A), but it is still higher for those who reduced hours of work.
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that it is higher for individuals that reduced hours of work. The survival curve in Figure 6
shows that those who do not reduce working time on average stay longer in the labour market.
Therefore, it seems that working hours’ flexibility will have no effect in expanding older
workers’ labour force participation. Those who reduce hours of work leave activity earlier
than those who do not.18 As Gielen (2009) suggests, other instruments, like the increase in
the legal retirement age, seem to be more effective in delaying the exit from the labour
market.
Like in Table 7 columns (3) and (4), Table 8, show separate estimates by gender. Once
again, a Chow test19 performed on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality
of coefficients between men and women. However, in this sample, the gender difference for
the Reduction B is not statistically different from zero (Chi-squared = 0.09 and p-value =
0.7634). This is in accordance with the statistical significance of the coefficient of the inter-
action term.
As in Table 7, being employed in the industrial sector reduces the likelihood of remaining
in activity: columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 suggest that the hazard of retirement is 10%
higher for those working in the industrial sector compared to those employed in services.
However, the coefficients on this variable are smaller in Table 8; in fact, the hazard is
reduced by 18-19 percentage points20 when considering Reduction B rather than Reduction
A. Once again, this difference is mainly due to women.
The evidence discussed so far indicates that a reduction in hours of work before
retirement seems to be associated with retirement at earlier ages.21 In fact, when asked
(Question 4 of the survey) if working hours’ flexibility would work as an incentive to
expand labour force participation, more than 90% of the elderly responded negatively.6 Conclusions
Portuguese older workers (55-64 years) present high activity and employment rates (54%
and 51%, respectively), above the European Union (EU25) average and already above the
50% threshold for the employment rate to be achieved in EU countries by 2010 (European
Commission 2008). Table 4 in section 3 shows a strong link between older workers and the
labour market: current and past working careers average above 35 years.Figure 5 Retirement hazard, by reduction status (Reduction B). Source: Computations from the authors
based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
Figure 6 Survival curve, by reduction status (Reduction B). Source: Computations from the authors
based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006.
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as they comprise the following conditions: at least 55 years old and a working career of 30
complete calendar years. Although eligible, more than half of the workers who remain in
the labour force state the need of obtaining a sufficient household income as the main
reason to keep working. Conditional on being in the labour force, more than 2/3 of the
workers who did not reduce hours of work report the above reason to remain in the labour
force while it is the reason pointed by 50% of those who have reduced hours of work.
Additionally, more than 30% of the employed individuals that have reduced hours of work
say they continue to work to increase retirement benefits against 20% of the answers for
those that have not reduced working hours. The percentage that keeps working for non-
financial reasons is higher (14%) for subjects with hours’ reduction than for those that have
not reduced hours of work (9%). There seems to be different financial motivations between
individuals that reduce hours of work and those who do not.
When someone chooses to reduce hours of work he/she knows that their labour earnings
will suffer a reduction. In a country with low average wages, like Portugal, with no partial
retirement mechanisms that decision embodies relevant financial implications. Therefore,
either the individual has a financial safety net that allows him/her to supplement the drop
in labour income with savings from previous periods or has other types of income (such as
rents, interests, etc.) allowing him/her to accommodate a wage reduction. If this is the case,
the same individual will be willing to retire at early ages despite the pension reduction.
Those who do not reduce hours of work may face stronger financial constraints. They may
have to work full-time for as long as possible and, therefore, exit from the labour force later.
Reducing hours of work before permanently leaving the labour force is believed to be
a potentially useful measure to improve the attractiveness of work for older workers.
This research, however, finds an association between working hours’ reduction and
retirement at earlier ages. Workers that choose to reduce their working schedule
appear to be preparing their exit from the labour force rather than delaying it.
A reduction of hours of work is not very usual in the Portuguese labour market and this
is, perhaps, the result of deficient opportunities provided by employers when it comes to
flexibility in hours of work. If that is true, those older workers that actually reduce hours of
work may be employed in firms that can offer phased retirement opportunities.
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Portugal there are no partial retirement mechanisms, that is, the possibility of accumulating
part-time wage with part-time retirement. Partial retirement could smooth the transition
from active life into retirement, motivating workers to work longer while reducing hours of
work with no significant income loss.
With these data we cannot tell if those who have reduced hours of work have more
income sources. In effect, the lack of variables associated with financial incentives is a major
drawback in the analysis. Also, the static, cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow
us to explore some dynamic features of relevance in the study of the retirement behaviour.
These include the evolution of working hours in the latest years in the labour force as well
as the correspondent change in wages, supplemented by information on Social Security
incentives.
The use of panel data with information on income and wealth variables, on Social
Security benefits, on hours of work and also on the moment that the reduction took place
would allow us to get more solid conclusions on the relevance of hours’ flexibility among
active ageing policies. Disentangle what is behind this positive association between
reduction and the retirement hazard for the Portuguese labour market remains a topic for
future research.Endnotes
1Age discrimination laws prohibit discrimination in hiring, promotion, wages or firing on
the grounds of age. These laws may also forbid the inclusion of statements or specifications
in job notices, or advertisements, of age preference and limitations; the laws can additionally
prohibit mandatory retirement based on age.
2Stylized facts show that labour force participation rates are smaller for older workers
(aged 55-64) than for prime-age workers (25-54 years old).
3In 2007, part-time employment in Portugal accounted for 10% of overall employment
(European Commission 2007).
4The web appendix is available here http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/mangelo/
appendix/appendix_hours.pdf.
5Additionally, besides the above mentioned exclusions, there are 19 observations missing
for the Reduction variable and, for retirees, there are 7 observations missing for the variable
used as proxy for the retirement age.
6Of the individuals reporting hours’ reduction 1/3 work in full-time jobs. Overall, only 8%
of the individuals in the sample are in part-time employment.
7In 1929, mandatory schooling in Portugal comprised 3 years and, in 1955, it increased by
1 year for men. Only in 1961 mandatory schooling was standardized in 4 years for both
men and women and, three years later, it was increased by 2 years; a law passed in 1986 set
it at 9 years for students with first school registration in the 1987/1988 academic year and
subsequent years. Hence, in 1995/1996 mandatory schooling comprised 9 years.
8The Nelson-Aalen estimator is a non-parametric estimator of the cumulative hazard
function consisting of a staircase function. The steps are located at each observed death
time and the vertical size of the steps is computed as 1/(number at risk), where
(number at risk) is the count of subjects just before the death that are still observed to
be alive.
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83% of the sampled individuals were out of the labour force (in the web appendix to this
paper) (Additional file 1: Appendix D).
10The Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions, by reduction status (in the web
appendix) (Additional file 1: Appendix D) reveal that the hazard increases at a higher rate
for those who reduce hours of work than it does for the individuals who do not
reduce hours of work.
11The survivor function is given by exp (-γtα).
12Cited from Ajzen (2005).
13If this module is to be surveyed in the future we suggest the inclusion of a question
to obtain the age of retirement.
14In Question 3b there are 2,535 observations missing for the intended age of retirement
of currently employed individuals. Therefore, from the sample of 3,319 employed individuals
(see Table 2), taking out 2,535 who did not report the intended age of retirement, we end up
with 784 observations for those employed. Adding to this figure the initial 1,954
observations for retirees, we get 2,738 observations available in the equations using the
variable Reduction B.
15Older people have a higher hazard of exit from the labour force.
16In our analysis we find a positive association between the reduction in working hours
and retirement at earlier ages but, within our analysis, one cannot claim causality. Due to
data limitations we cannot, in a satisfactory way, estimate a causal effect.
17Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 90.91 (p-value = 0.00).
18One can argue that the Portuguese case is very particular (with a very low share of part-
time employment and the impossibility of a part-time retirement mechanism) and that the
extrapolation of results is difficult. However, comparable aggregate statistics for European
Union countries (available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_
unemployment_lfs/data/database) - obtained through the 2006 Transition to Retirement
module that was enforced in each EU country - seem to suggest that the availability of more
flexible working time arrangements would have a small effect on retaining older individuals
in the labor force. On average, almost ¾ of the employed persons in the EU27 state that
they would not have stayed (or will not stay) longer at work if flexible working time
arrangements were available.
19Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 53.96 (p-value = 0.00).
20The difference results from comparing estimates for the “Industrial” category in
Columns (1) and (2), Table 8, with columns (1) and (3) of Table 7.
21We have also run each regression excluding the public sector. Results are not different
from the ones reported. Additionally, several robustness tests were performed using other
parametric and semiparametric models. Results remained unchanged and these can be
obtained from the authors upon request.Additional file
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Questionnaire of the module “Transition to Retirement”. Appendix C: Definitions of industry and worker type.
Appendix D: Survival and hazard functions (Portugal Portuguese legislation 1990).
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